‘Go West Young Man’: The Culture of Migration among Muslims in Hyderabad, India
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Most studies of migration that ask why and how people migrate examine economic rationales and the network connections of migrants. In this article, I explore one understudied aspect of the migration process, the 'culture of migration', using data gathered from field research in Hyderabad, India. Hyderabad is a city with substantial capital investment, especially from IT companies, and is an excellent site to examine how the desire to migrate remains salient in spite of the immigration of capital to the migrants’ home setting, resulting in increased job opportunities at home, at least for professionals. Additionally, greater restrictions have been placed by Persian Gulf states on migrant labourers, resulting in decreased opportunities abroad. I argue that it is the culture of migration among Hyderabad Muslim professionals and labourers that promotes migration to the US and Saudi Arabia, even though opportunities at home are greater for some, and opportunities abroad are more restricted for others. I further argue that this culture of migration helps to shape the effects of remittances on status relations and marriage patterns among Muslims in Hyderabad, which further promotes migration abroad.

Keywords: Migration; Culture; Stratification; Muslim; Hyderabad

Introduction

Since the 1960s, migration from Hyderabad has become commonplace, even normative. Hyderabad, a city with a large Muslim population, is a major sender of migrants to the Persian Gulf and the West (Leonard 1999; Naidu 1990; Sharieff 1994), and is vying to become the IT capital of India. Major corporations such as Microsoft, Oracle and others have set up development sites in and around the
software park known as Hi-tec City, spurring smaller transnational corporations and Indian-owned ventures as well to move to Hyderabad, leading to a rise in salaries of IT workers.1

Even with the influx of foreign and local hi-tech capital, however, the rush to emigrate to the West and the Gulf has not lessened for young IT professionals (Ali 2001; Lloyd 1998). Nor has the rush to migrate for labourers diminished, in spite of greater restrictions put on visas by the Gulf states (Winckler 1997), and the greater insecurity of wages and labour in those Gulf states. Given that there are more job opportunities at home for professionals, and more risk abroad for labourers, why do they still clamour to go?

To understand this paradox, I propose that we need to examine more closely what Kandel and Massey (2002) call the ‘culture of migration’: the cultural atmosphere that leads many to decide to migrate. The culture of migration framework is a complement to examining economic factors and network ties to migrate. Using data gathered from ethnographic research in a regional capital city, Hyderabad, I argue that the culture of migration, by shaping the effects of migrant remittances, transforms traditional ideas of marriage and status and links them instead to migratory movements. Thus, migration changes local culture in a way that affects not only those families that send migrants abroad, but also those who remain at home. While a few rural studies have been enlightening regarding the social ramifications of migration and remittances upon status constructions for those in the sending societies (Gardner 1995; Ghosh 1992; Kurien 2002), this study is set in an urban location with substantial capital investment, especially from IT companies. This will allow for an examination of how a culture of migration remains salient despite the immigration of capital, which results in increased job and salary opportunities at home, at least for professionals.

I will further examine how the culture of migration differentially affects the desire to migrate, and how the choice of destination varies by class—with professionals showing a preference for the US, while less-skilled workers generally try to emigrate to Saudi Arabia. I also show how the culture of migration shapes educational choices and attitudes towards work in Hyderabad, as potential migrants continually keep an eye on the possibility of working and living abroad.

Method

The data for this paper come from research conducted in Hyderabad over a period of 21 months in 1997–98, 2000 and 2002. During this time I lived in a neighbourhood in the economically depressed Muslim-majority Old City, and interacted closely with neighbours, local storeowners and their workers, and people in cafés, a central point of male social life in Hyderabad. I engaged in participant observation of religious festivals, weddings, prayers at mosques, a gym, a karate school, two computer-programming institutes, public meetings, and other functions. I further conducted 188 open-ended interviews (33 women and 155 men). Some interviews were more
formal, where I took notes during their conduct. The bulk of the interviews, however, were more informal and I did not take notes at the time. Rather, after the interview, I would either immediately write up the interview notes, or would do so later in the day. All interviews were written up the same day. While some information was no doubt lost in the time lag between the interview and write-up, I felt that tape-recording, or even taking notes during interviews, was too obtrusive—a lesson I learned early in the fieldwork process.

I obtained interviewees through non-random ‘snowball’ sampling. I started with a core of persons with whom I interacted formally and informally in different social locations, and used their contacts to expand the scope of persons whom I interviewed. Interviews were conducted in homes, offices, cafés, stores, religious shrines, mosques, a slaughterhouse, two computer-programming institutes, and other places convenient to those being interviewed. All interviews were in Deccani Urdu (a variation of Urdu spoken in Hyderabad) and/or English.

The interviews that I conducted were part of a larger project on social change and identity construction among Muslims, in which I examined expressions of ethnicity, status patterns, and religious practice (Ali 2001). As part of this project, I came to focus on the effects that migration has for the individual, family and community. While conducting interviews among potential or returned migrants, especially among computer programmers, I informally interviewed a half-dozen young Hindu males. While the data I gathered from these men was limited, their attitudes toward work and migration did not differ substantially from Muslim men, with the exception that those wishing to migrate to the Gulf states usually said they would prefer to go the United Arab Emirates, instead of Saudi Arabia as most of the Muslim men preferred.

**Present State of the Field**

*Culture of Migration*

Kandel and Massey (2002: 982) note that the culture of migration is a prominent theme in studies of Mexican migration to the US (see, for instance, Alarcon 1992; Cohen 2004; Massey *et al*. 1987; Mines 1981; Reichert 1981). However, cultures of migration have not been studied much beyond this particular stream, although there are a few exceptions (e.g. Heering *et al*. 2004). Oddly, a clear definition or outline of the contents of a culture of migration has not been advanced in the literature. I propose a working conceptualisation here: the culture of migration is those ideas, practices and cultural artefacts that reinforce the celebration of migration and migrants. This includes beliefs, desire, symbols, myths, education, celebrations of migration in various media, and material goods.

The culture-of-migration argument, simply put, is that migration is a learned social behaviour; people learn to migrate, and they learn to desire to migrate. Kandel and Massey, in their study of Mexican migrants to the US, state: ‘The essence of the culture-of-migration argument is that non-migrants observe migrants to whom they
are socially connected and seek to emulate their migratory behavior’ (2002: 983). The culture of migration, thus, is a product of the increased prevalence of migration in a community, and the increase in density of migration networks (Massey et al. 1998: 45–50).

Kandel and Massey view the culture of migration as a product of direct links to migrants. They write that ‘as communities and families shift from low to high involvement in US migration, cultural attitudes increasingly shift to increase the likelihood that future cohorts of young people will seek their fortune abroad rather than at home’ (2002: 996). I qualify this by arguing that, while those who already have relatives abroad may be highly motivated to migrate, those without migrant relatives may equally desire to migrate in a social milieu where migration is a culturally diffused norm. That is, while the culture of migration may have its roots in migrant networks, its effects spread out to those without such social networks.

Migration is not just about economic success, it is also about status and marriage networks at home, two social concepts that are central to how Indians define their identities. Kandel and Massey describe how Mexican migrants to the US affect the social values of potential migrants in Mexico: ‘Young people who grow up and come of age increasingly expect to migrate internationally in the course of their lives... [T]hose who do not attempt [to migrate] are seen as lazy, unenterprising, and undesirable as potential mates’ (2002: 982). The status of migrants is higher than the status of non-migrants; migration then becomes the easiest way to increase one’s marriage marketability or status value as ‘potential mates.’ Migration, in the Indian context, transforms traditional social relations in India. For example, Xiang (2001), in a study of Hindu male IT professionals from Andhra Pradesh working in Australia, showed how their status as migrants inflated the amount of dowry they could demand from prospective brides. I also noted in Hyderabad how in many cases dowry demands were wildly inflated when one of the prospective marriage partners was a migrant.

While other scholars have touched upon cultural aspects of migration (e.g. Gardner 1995; Kurien 2002), Kandel and Massey’s study of Mexican migrants to the US is the only in-depth theoretical exposition of the culture of migration to date. I expand their focus on the culture of migration of less educated, unskilled migrants by examining how the culture of migration affects people differentially by class and skill, and how the widespread diffusion of this culture also affects those without any direct links to migrants. I go beyond their emphasis on the economic benefits of migration and remittances, and examine the effects of migration and remittances on status relations at home. I now turn to a discussion of studies of the effects of migrant remittances.

**Emigration and Remittances**

The most robust literature on remittances has focused on how financial remittances of workers in the Gulf states affect consumption patterns of family members in such
countries as Bangladesh, Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Yemen (e.g. Ali et al. 1981; Amjad 1989; Gunatilleke 1986, 1991; Swanson 1979) and, of course, India (Kurien 1994; Madhavan 1998; Mowli 1992; Nayyar 1994; Prakash 1998; Sekher 1997). While remittances certainly affect consumer spending at home, they also greatly enhance the culture of migration; however, studies of the effects of emigrants on sending societies have not made this link.

Transnational studies are a partial corrective to this focus on financial remittances, contributing to understanding the dynamics of the flow of personnel, money and ideas back and forth between host and sender societies (Appadurai 1997; Levitt 2001a; Portes 1997, 2001; Portes et al. 1999; Schiller et al. 1995). Not only do people, ideas and things flow in both directions, they are also often value-enhanced. For instance, Levitt (1998) examines how Dominican immigrants in Boston send ‘social remittances’, such as political strategies learned in the US, back to those in their village, who then deploy them locally.

While studies of transnationalism have furthered our understanding of migrant behaviour, they tend to be theoretically oriented toward how migrants move back and forth, rather than addressing why migrants leave in the first place, or how migration affects the ways people at home interact with each other (a notable exception is Levitt 2001b). The studies that have examined such aspects are of rural communities, possibly as the effects of migrants upon rural communities have been easiest to observe and analyse. For example, Ghosh (1992) describes how the remittances of rural Egyptian migrants in Iraq upset the village status hierarchy. Lefebvre (1999) and Gamburd (2000) respectively discuss how the migration of men from Pakistan and women from Sri Lanka changes gender roles in rural agrarian economies. Gardner (1995), in her study of Bangladeshi villages in the Sylhet region, which is a major sender of migrants to the UK, examined how variations in migration patterns affect economic and status relations, gender dynamics and religious practice.

Studies of Indian migrants have also examined the effects of migration on rural life, looking at such topics as how remittances from England and the US affect status relations and Sikh politics in Punjabi villages (Helweg 1986, 1989; LaBrack 1989), and how migration to Kenya allowed for the social mobility of an entire Gujarati caste (Chandra 1997). Kurien (2002) examined how religion mediates the effects of migration in three villages in rural Kerala. In a Hindu village, she found that migration led to an inversion of rank of the two major castes; in a Christian village, the high castes took advantage of migration, leading to greater caste polarisation; but in a Muslim village, the economic success of the low castes served to erode the caste differences, and broke down endogamous patterns of marriage.2

**Research Site and Background**

Migration from Hyderabad is a recent phenomenon. In the pre-independence period, few Hyderbadis, save for the children of the *nawabs* (nobles), migrated out for education or work. In the 1921 census, only 341 persons from Hyderabad State had
emigrated from the state. Since Hyderabad became part of the Indian Republic in 1948, however, migration has become a common practice for Muslims and Hindus of all economic and status backgrounds. The first migratory wave was a relatively small and brief one to Pakistan that included Hyderabadi Muslims from the Nizam’s armed forces, members of the Razakars (a Muslim paramilitary organisation) and Urdu journalists, in the aftermath of the Police Action in September 1948 (Khalidi 1997a). Muslim and Hindu students, and middle- and upper-class persons migrating to the United Kingdom followed this initial wave of migration to Pakistan. The United States and Canada have been receptive to students and educated persons since the 1960s, and Australia has become a popular destination for students and all classes of migrants since the 1970s.

Since the 1970s, working in the Gulf has also become very popular and important to all classes of persons, especially lower-class skilled and unskilled labourers (Leonard 2003). In a random sample survey of Muslim households in Hyderabad’s Old City between 1984 and 1986, it was found that 21 per cent of Muslim households (126 of 591) had at least one family member in the Gulf (Naidu 1990: 96). In a smaller non-random survey, 60 per cent of all male children (243 of 399) in the sample were working in the Gulf. This varied by class: 70 per cent of upper class, 66 per cent of middle class, 83 per cent of lower class skilled, but only 21 per cent of lower class unskilled male children of respondents were working in the Gulf (Javed 1990: 104). How many families actually have members abroad is difficult to say. Likely, the numbers lie somewhere in between the figures given in these two studies.

The rise in the importance of migration is obviously related to work, study and travel opportunities abroad. But it is also the result of changes at home. Until 1948, the dominant mode of stratification was a strict status system, based on one’s social distance from the Nizam. Social life in the city revolved around his person. In 1948 this status order and political regime came undone, first with the deposition of the Nizam, and soon thereafter the dispossession of the landholdings of the nawabs. Thus, the status stratification system for Muslims fell apart.

During the time of Osman Ali Khan, the last Nizam (ruled 1911–48), there was little opportunity for economic mobility. But with independence came, slowly, economic development and educational opportunities, and the expansion of the Indian middle class. By the 1950s, and even more by the 1960s, education was becoming accessible to greater numbers of people across India, and job opportunities were expanding. Individual achievement was now becoming as important, if not more important, than ascribed characteristics such as caste or nobility in defining one’s status, at least in large urban centres.

While educational and occupational opportunities were expanding, they were doing so unequally. Many professional non-elite Muslims and Hindus—doctors and engineers—who had completed their education in the 1960s found that there was limited opportunity for them at home. Here we find the first ‘push’ for migration from Hyderabad. While the lack of opportunity may or may not have been due to class discrimination, or discrimination against Muslims, among many Muslims and
professional Hindus from non-elite backgrounds, this was certainly a powerful perception.

Since the early 1990s, India has embarked on an ambitious programme of economic liberalisation, removing many of the roadblocks to local and foreign investment, known as the ‘license raj’; a pattern of licensing requirements that effectively shackled much economic investment and factory expansion. As the license raj is being dismantled, the economy has grown rapidly, and employment opportunities, at least for those with professional degrees, have expanded greatly at home. IT investment has exploded over the past decade and a half in India generally, and Hyderabad in particular. Still, many of the young Muslim IT professionals I interviewed would not even apply for jobs at major corporations in Hi-tec City, because they felt that Hindus would never hire them.

The Culture of Migration in Hyderabad

In the rest of the paper, I will detail how the culture of migration operates in Hyderabad to affect the behaviour of migrants and non-migrants. In the first subsection, I examine how economic remittances from migrants have affected changes in the ways that status as a social identity has come to be defined, from ascribed to achieved criteria. Migrants have come to be seen as something of heroes, people to be emulated. In the next, I briefly outline two of the basic processes that reinforce the celebration of migrants and the culture of migration: desire and education. I then examine how the thought, or possibility, of migration affects how people conceive of working at home. While the culture of migration has become embedded in Muslim society in Hyderabad, there are those who choose not to migrate, creating in essence a subculture of non-migration. I tentatively explore how some people actively become non-migrants. Lastly, I examine how some poor Hyderabadi women are forced to become migrants through marriage.

How Economic Remittances Affect Status Transformations

As I noted in the introduction, potential migrants are seduced by the economic possibilities of work abroad, though they may well know that opportunities abroad have been greatly reduced. It is well-known that those who have gone abroad before them have earned tidy sums—for labourers this can be up to ten times what they could earn in Hyderabad, and professionals can earn much more than that. Migrants send remittances from these increased earnings for basic necessities of purchasing property or renovating/expanding existing properties, and for luxury items such as refrigerators, TVs, VCRs, scooters, cordless and mobile telephones (though most of these are now perceived as necessities). These remittances can be a large percentage of overall family income, often indeed the only, or predominant, source of family income. Those who are in the US will remit to family in Hyderabad on a regular basis, but those in Saudi Arabia, especially unattached young males, generally remit the
major proportion of their incomes. For example, Iftekar, a 20-year-old store clerk in Saudi Arabia, earned 2,000 riyals per month in 1998, approximately US$500. His housing is paid for by the company, food is cheap, and there is little in the way of entertainment to waste money on, save for watching Hindi films on video. So from this, he remitted over $2,500 per year. While not everyone remits or saves this much, I was regularly told by migrants that single male migrants in Saudi Arabia generally remit half or more of their monthly incomes (Kurien 2002 also found this to be the case).

Materially, those who have people abroad, whether the families are rich or poor, live better than they would otherwise, as the incomes of workers abroad are substantially greater than what they could earn in Hyderabad. The remittances have a great effect upon economic mobility of Muslims in Hyderabad. But the remittances also greatly affect the ways that people conceive of status. The definitions of status are changing, and who is high-status is changing. The increased affluence of those who were once poor challenges formerly hierarchical relations between Muslims, from a system of stratification where birth-ascribed identities (caste and nobility) were more important before 1948, to today, where achievement (i.e. money, education and occupation) is becoming more important (Ali 2001, 2002). A local Muslim historian, who is also a member of an important nawabi family, said to me: ‘The social structure is still changing, you can’t map clearly where people are’. As an example, he gave his former servant’s son, who went to the Gulf as a mechanic for fifteen years and built himself a large house. The professor himself lives in a small rented flat in the Old City. ‘What is the relation now?’ he asked. He answered, ‘We both have tension about how to relate to each other now that he is economically above me’.

The indeterminacy of the status order makes it easier for the nouveau riche and other upwardly mobile aspirants to try and transform their wealth into status (see Milner 1994; Srinivas 1976). Those with increased affluence publicly display, and share, their new-found wealth. Money is put to social use for dowries and wedding costs, and other life-cycle rituals where large sums are spent on feasts. I witnessed several weddings of migrants and non-migrants, and the weddings of migrants were celebrated on a grander scale, with the public display of dowry more impressive than of the non-migrants.

This emphasis on ritual public display is not a particularly new phenomenon—spending is long been an important marker of who is high-status, and indeed is required of those who are high-status, or who aspire to be thought of as such. Srinivas (1976: 209), in his famous ethnography of Rampura village in southern India in the years immediately after independence, wrote that the patron ‘must indulge in lavish spending at weddings and funerals, and is judged by the magnificence of the dinner, dance and fireworks, and the number and importance of the guests who had attended the wedding’. What is different now is that the sheer number of people for whom giving such a feast is within their reach has expanded greatly, and this is due in large part to inflated wealth as a result of remittances from abroad (Kurien 1994). Those who were lower-class before, rise due to quick and
substantial earnings from abroad, quite often becoming wealthier than the old elite. As the wealth of the *nouveau riche* (and not-so-riche) increases relative to the old-status elite, the importance of the old elite declines even further.

This large-scale spending on feasts and other rituals has been characterised by some authors as wasteful (Javed 1990; Naidu 1990) but the expenditures are in fact essential and basic costs. While they are not ‘useful’ investments in the way that investing in stocks or property or business will give a financial return, they do give a *social* return, i.e. there is a return upon the investor’s status. To convert wealth to status, it is not enough to have, but to display. And it is not enough merely to display, but to lavishly distribute to others, particularly at wedding feasts and as dowry. To have money and not to share is interpreted as resembling the stereotype of the hated, thrifty (read cheap) Hindu Marwari shop-owner/money-lender, who has a fortune but dresses in a dirty *banyan* (t-shirt) and *dhoti* (sarong-like wrap-around pants). For a well-off man to give a feast for his son or daughter where there are not enough chicken or mutton dishes is an almost unforgivable social *faux pas*. To not give a generous dowry is often interpreted as a lack of love for one’s daughter, as well as being cheap. On the face of it, this seems to be a very traditional mode of using wealth for social display. However, the fact that so many people are able to give such elaborate feasts is indicative of how this hierarchical social order has been altered.

Feasts and dowries are important indicators of status, but social status is still best measured by whom one marries (Milner 1994). As noted above, the basis of status is changing from ascribed to achieved criteria. One major reason for going abroad is the possibility of remaking oneself, which is tied to the possibility of making vastly more money, which can alter a person’s status. Just as important, being a migrant *in itself* has become a status marker. When Muslim men, or women for that matter, go off to the Gulf or the US, the way they are perceived in Hyderabad changes. Their identities of caste or nobility become secondary or irrelevant. They become highly valued commodities, irrespective of what they were before the transforming act of migration. Marriage to one of these migrants is perceived as an easy escape from the India that many young, educated men and women in Hyderabad have learned to dread, and leads to upward status mobility.

One of the best ways of determining current assessments of status is the marriage market, since the various prospects are weighed against each other publicly through discussion, gossip and ultimately the choice of a mate. The marriage market in Hyderabad has been greatly affected by both labour migration and permanent emigration. The definition of a ‘good catch’ and a good family has changed dramatically. Where once being of a high-caste or *nawabi* family, or a descendent of the Nizam, was prestigious and defined a family as desirable, since at least the 1960s it is occupations such as doctors and engineers that are desirable. It is even better if the man works abroad, regardless of education or occupation. This was made clear to me by Iqbal the *payamwala* (matchmaker), who would come to my house often (to try to find a match for my cousin) and describe the local marriage scene. He said that people looking to fix marriages these days want a girl who looks like Madhubala
(a famous film actress) and they want qualifications such as doctor, engineer, or ‘Gulf-employed’—much better if it is a Gulf-employed doctor or engineer. IT professionals are especially prized, particularly if they have US visas. Some people are concerned with caste, but not that many (Ali 2002). Some people still aspire to marry into *nawabi* families, to enhance their social status by associating with these traditionally high-status people. But the *nawabs* themselves are sending their offspring to work and live abroad, to reinforce their ascribed status through achieved status. What has emerged in the marriage market is a new hierarchy of qualities sought—achieved rather than ascribed, and wealth, education and occupation rather than caste or nobility.

Largely as a result of opportunities in the West or the Gulf, dowry demands have skyrocketed in the last 20 years, with Saudi Arabian visas often being demanded from the bride’s family as part of the dowry for the prospective groom. Young men and women looking for mates will advertise (more usually, their parents or older siblings will advertise through word of mouth and matrimonial ads in newspapers and the internet) that they have a Saudi Arabian visa, or American green card or H1B visa. This guarantees a high quality of responses—either ones who themselves have outside visas, or the better-looking candidates, the wealthy, and/or highly educated (Xiang 2001). I examined six months of matrimonials for Muslims in Siyasat, the most widely read Urdu daily in Hyderabad, and also examined responses that came to a matrimonial advertisement placed in Siyasat for a young, male computer programmer living in Scotland. Not once did any of the ads mention the caste of the person advertised, nor did they specify the caste of partner sought. What was common, however, was advertising that the person in the ad had some kind of foreign visa, or that a foreign visa holder was sought. The responses to the young man’s ads exhibited similar characteristics. The biodatas (matrimonial resumés) of the potentials stressed the academic and employment achievements of immediate family members, especially if there were family members living abroad. None made any mention of caste. From the ads and responses it became clear that, not only do the men living abroad get the best women, they get bigger dowries, which is often seen as the same thing. Women living or working abroad also get a finer selection. Those who manage to get abroad are seen as victorious, and to the victor go the spoils.

*Getting There*

For Muslims, Saudi Arabia is relatively easy to get to. The skilled worker can go through an agent, or interview directly for a job, and go on a work visa. The migrant may or may not have to pay an agent. For unskilled workers it is a bit more risky; they pay an agent 50,000–75,000 rupees (in 1998, during my main period of fieldwork, about 40 rupees equalled US$ 1), get an ‘azad’ (open) work visa through the agent, and take their chances on finding employment once there. This is dangerous, as they entrust an agent with their money and passport and hope that the agent will not just take both and disappear, which often happens. Alternately, a relative or friend can
have an Arab employer send a visa to Hyderabad. This is a fairly safe and risk-free method, not to mention cheaper as there is no agent’s fee, though it is less common than going through an agent since it needs personal contacts. The situation is similar for migrants to other parts of the Gulf. Shah (2000) surveyed 800 South Asian males employed in skilled or unskilled jobs in Kuwait and found that 34 per cent moved to Kuwait via relatives and friends, while half came through recruitment agents. Those who came through relatives and friends were happier and earned higher salaries than those who came through agents.

In the case of the US, there is a general desire to migrate, but the reality is that only those with family already settled there can go (on family reunification schemes), or those with enough money or education. They obtain student visas, or those with technical degrees can get H1-B professional work visas. Many migrate illegally; overstaying tourist visas is a popular method. For the US, as for Saudi Arabia, agents often play a critical role in facilitating acquisition of the student, work and tourist visas, for a fee of course.

Desiring to go to Saudi Arabia and the US

Most young Muslim men I came across in Hyderabad, professional or labourer, skilled or unskilled, expressed a desire to go to the Gulf. For unskilled workers, it is a way to earn much more than they possibly could in Hyderabad. For educated young men it is thought to be a good first step to get to the US, as it allows younger persons to get the work experience they need for applying for a visa, and the consular officers may be more obliging in Saudi Arabia than they are in India. Xiang (2004) makes a similar point about Indian IT migrants who go to Australia or Singapore as first steps towards going to the US.

Saudi Arabia is a popular destination because people in Hyderabad are intimately familiar with Saudi Arabian life through the stories of returned migrants, and through the knowledge that they will not be alone, even if they go alone and do not already know migrants working there. Single, young men congregate in teashops in cities such as Jeddah and Riyadh. There are areas in these cities where the stores, restaurants and atmosphere are strongly reminiscent of Hyderabad. The Hyderabadi working populations are large, and the workers seek each other out. As one Jeddah-returned man put it:

If someone new comes, they say, ‘Where are you from?’
The boy says ‘Hyderabad’.
‘Where in Hyderabad?’
‘Old City’.
‘Where in Old City?’
‘Sultan Shahi’.
‘Oh! You’re my neighbour, come eat . . .’
Then their friendship becomes fast and cemented.
This lack of fear of international migration is not limited to the migrants, but extends to other family members. Generally, there are few qualms about distance, few fears about losing touch with friends and relatives. They are ready to sacrifice day-to-day family life for the hope of economic and social security that family members may find abroad. Some have doubts, like Bilqees, a middle-aged schoolteacher whose cousins are in the US and rarely visit Hyderabad. She forbade her son Habeeb, a recent university graduate, from going to the US, saying it would be much better to go to Saudi Arabia so he could visit every year. He contemplated going to Singapore, which an agent was touting as possibly becoming the new hotspot for work. But his visa for the US at the time was ‘in process’ (relatives in the US had sent the money), and he planned to go. His mother was resigned to his going.

After I returned to the US from doing fieldwork in 1998, Habeeb informed me that his agent, with whom he entrusted his money and passport, had disappeared with both. While it might seem reasonable that Habeeb’s family members, after such a horrible experience, might pressure him to stay, this was not the case. He was actually being pressured by family members to try to migrate to Saudi Arabia, and then to try to migrate to the US from there. When I went back in December 2000, I found that he went to Saudi Arabia on an azad (open) work visa, and got a job with a Saudi Arabian company as a Windows NT administrator. I came across many cases of individuals who, despite being fleeced by agents in this manner, refused to give up their goal of migrating to Saudi Arabia, and took more money from family members or additional loans from money-lenders to realise their goals.

The desire to migrate is not only based on the promise of financial security, but also is rooted in a sense of adventure, especially for those wishing to go to Western countries. While few feel they are pioneers, there is often a desire to explore what for them is uncharted territory, to see for themselves what they have seen and read about in the media, and the stories received from returned migrants. I was often forced by young, educated Hyderabidis to discuss the intricacies of cultural life in the US as they prepared for their migration for work or study to the US, the UK, Canada or Australia. Usually I was quizzed, and often had to defend perceived lax moral standards to an audience that was often appalled, though at the same time titillated, fascinated, and a bit envious. At times, their knowledge of daily life in places such as Houston or Palo Alto was surprisingly detailed and nuanced. More often though, their knowledge was shallow and negatively stereotypical.

The culturally-rooted desire to migrate was often enhanced by such things as enjoyment of Western music and lifestyle depictions through various Indian and Western media, including MTV and the pan-Asian satellite channel ‘Channel [V]’. Western soap operas, the widespread showing and popularity of Western films in cinemas (shown in English and also dubbed into different Indian languages), and the depictions of Indians living in Western countries in Hindi films (one of which featured the hero and heroine dancing in a suburban office parking lot), all built up familiarity with Western popular and entertainment culture. It was also common to
see this desire reflected simply in the adornment of their motorcycles with stickers of American, Canadian, British and Australian flags.

Education

The desire to go to Saudi Arabia, and the knowledge that they will go, often start at an early age. This is reflected in educational choices. Habeeb told me that when he was in the ninth grade, his father suggested that, for his optional language, he should take Telegu—the official language of Andhra Pradesh—as this would make getting employment in Hyderabad easier. Habeeb had said, ‘Look, I’m not going to stay in Hyderabad. I’m following my uncles to Saudi Arabia.’ So instead he took Arabic. This linguistic planning has been happening for some time. Naidu (1990: 88) reports that Arabic was commonly taught in many schools, and that this is directly related to the prospects for Gulf employment. Many private schools have adopted Arabic as the primary medium of instruction, and others offer it as a second language.

Most educated young people I spoke with in Hyderabad who intended to migrate, wanted to go ultimately to the US. The educated migrants who successfully migrate to the US tend to be in fields such as engineering or IT, the latter being the preferred occupation for H1B temporary work visas. Mukarram, a young doctor, said that 90 per cent of his female classmates in medical school wanted to emigrate. He claims they all married engineers settled in the US, and then migrated. He also tried in the mid-1990s, standing in line at the US Consulate in Chennai, but was rejected because he was a doctor, a profession no longer given visa preference by the US, although (he related), all the engineers and computer people got through. Mukarram later migrated to Saudi Arabia by fluke. He was in Delhi on some other business and had heard there was a Saudi delegation in Delhi recruiting for hospitals for the Saudi Ministry of the Interior. So he went for an interview and was immediately hired.

The preferences of potential employers in Western countries are well-known, and shape educational choices of potential migrants (Xiang 2004). The computer programming field is still hot, in spite of the ‘dotcom’ bust of the late 1990s, and the number of institutions that offer software training in such programmes as Oracle, Java, C++, Peoplesoft, etc. have mushroomed over the past ten years. Many of these programming institutes also double as visa agents, helping to garner work visas for Western countries.

The glorification of migration has also had an inflationary effect upon schooling, the cost of which has gone up considerably in Hyderabad, due in part to the increased wealth of the many with Gulf money. Private schools abound, with medical and engineering colleges wooing Indians in the US, Canada and the UK with the lure of cheap education and the free added bonus of Indian culture. One medical college in Hyderabad in 1998 advertised an MBBS course (undergraduate medical degree) for $67,500 for non-resident Indians (though today the cost is surely much more). The cost to locals was approximately one-third of this. English language, convent-run grammar schools target families whose children are in Hyderabad but who have
access to hard currency.\(^8\) While they do not directly favour Gulf people, those who contribute to school building funds in hard currency are shown preference when their children apply for admission. Since those with connections abroad have access to hard currency, it is often easier for the Gulf-connected to get their children into prestigious convent schools.

In addition to the financial cost of schooling in Hyderabad, there is a social cost for migrant families. It is quite common, especially for professionals, for the husband to work in Saudi Arabia for extended periods, and for the wife to stay home with the children, and to school them in Hyderabad, as the quality of schools is purportedly better in Hyderabad than in the Gulf. This affords the wife some social freedoms, as she often moves back into her parents’ home—though often she stays in her in-laws’ home. Najma’s husband has been working as an engineer in Saudi Arabia for 15 years; the whole while she has been in Hyderabad with her three children. Najma lives in her own house around the corner from her parents’ house. Her husband comes home for less than two months of every year. She told me that it was a difficult but necessary situation, as her husband could not earn nearly as much in Hyderabad as he does in Saudi Arabia. Besides, she sees her parents more than she otherwise could if he lived in Hyderabad.

How Thinking About Emigrating Affects Work at Home

The desire to emigrate, and the anticipation that this will happen, affect the organisation of work, or not working, at home. In almost any café in Hyderabad there will be young men of working age sitting around. They are, and are not loafers. They are, and are not unemployed. They sit, share a cup of tea, study, gossip, and wait. They wait for agents to process their visas, not working in the meantime. They wait for their brothers or sisters to send money from the US or Saudi Arabia, and they wait for them to send visas. The rationale is sound. Umesh, a young Hindu male studying at a computer institute, put it this way: ‘If my older sister is sending me 6,000 rupees a month for spending money, why should I take a job for 2,000?’

Not working is not just a question of money. Majid, the owner of a gymnasium in the Old City where some of these café boys come to lift weights, said these people will not work at jobs in Hyderabad where the salaries are low, especially where the status of the job is also low. ‘They most certainly would not work at jobs they feel are beneath them, like being waiters or clerks’, he said. This is not to imply that this attitude is a direct result of opportunities abroad. Probably they would not work at such low-status occupations anyway. But they are prepared to do anything once they are abroad. For example, Malik and Muzzamil, both Master’s-degree-holders from a Hyderabadi university, illegally overstayed their tourist visas and worked as gas station attendants—work they would never consider in Hyderabad—in Chicago and Milwaukee respectively in 1998 (both Malik and Muzzamil had family living in the US, but found it easier to get to the US on tourist visas rather than waiting many years for family reunification visas to be processed). Malik told me there were three
others from his university with Master’s degrees in business who were pumping gas within a few miles of where he worked in the Chicago suburbs.

Helweg (1986: 376) makes a similar point about status and work among rural Punjabi emigrants in England in the 1980s. He writes: ‘Men were so busy making their fortune that caste rules were often overlooked, and proud high caste men performed demeaning jobs which involved cleaning latrines and sweeping cigarette butts—work they would never do in Punjab’. This happens because the stigma attached to low-status jobs in Western countries is less than in India. Cleaning latrines in other countries, while low-status, is not necessarily reviled.

The point here is that an important factor in the motivation to not work in Hyderabad is the lower economic and social returns on work there compared to getting money from abroad or working abroad. Once abroad, status anxieties about certain jobs dissolve.

Migration ‘Refuseniks’

Most Muslims in Hyderabad, however, will remain and work in Hyderabad. Some remain because they are too poor to go. While it seems that every neighbourhood in Hyderabad is depleted of young men, many of the poorest neighbourhoods do not send young men off. In one such neighbourhood, the local social worker said, ‘only one boy in a population of 5,000 is in the Gulf. In such poverty, it is not possible to raise the minimum 50,000 rupees necessary for a visa for Saudi Arabia.’ In her neighbourhood, it is difficult even to get the funds necessary to purchase an auto-rickshaw (a three-wheeled motor taxi which costs roughly 25,000 rupees).

For others, it is a collective decision not to go. The Qureshis, or goat-butcher caste, do not allow their girls to go off to the Gulf to work as servants. They consider it ‘dirty.’ Even the boys do not go nearly as much as others in Hyderabad. The elders look down upon labour migration, preferring the young to stay in Hyderabad and do business. This is becoming more difficult, however, as younger butchers are finding it harder to start their own shops; there is less opportunity for them than for their parents’ generation. Slowly, more and more young men are taking to labour migration.

While some cannot, or will not, migrate, it has become ‘normative’ to migrate in search of work, in large part to fulfill a man’s duty to provide for his family. Not migrating, or rather not wanting to migrate, is perceived as ‘deviant’ behaviour. Those who choose not to go must defend the decision, rationalising their abnormal stance, as those who are unwilling to go are often pitied or derided for being bad providers—they are letting their families down. Being middle class and professional is no longer sufficient for life in Hyderabad. Consider Salman, a civil engineer who runs his own construction business, contracting with the state government. The hours are long, but the pay reasonable, though by no means great. Salman has been reluctant to go because he does not want to be so far from his family. He lives in a joint household, with his parents, his older sister and older brother. His older sister’s
husband lives and works in Saudi Arabia, sending money back for her and for their son. They have built a three-story addition onto one corner of the joint family house for themselves. Salman's older brother and wife both are physicians. The older brother lived and worked in Iran for ten years before returning to Hyderabad. Her parents in addition are wealthy, and have built them a large house in a smarter neighbourhood, with room on the ground floor to rent out to stores. In contrast, Salman, his wife Sara and their three young children live in a single room off the courtyard. Salman's parents, brother and sister have been pressing him to go to Saudi Arabia, or try to emigrate to the US or the UK, a suggestion he has resisted for many years. But this is an issue that his family keeps pressing him—and pressing his wife—to act on, insisting that he must go. This has been a source of family tension since they were married in 1992.

While a culture of migration has become embedded in Hyderabad, there are still some who are resentful of those who wait for the call to go away, and refuse to work at home, thereby neglecting their duty to their community. Hasan, a former nawab with a PhD in philosophy, was angry as he spoke of the boys who bide their time to go to Saudi Arabia. He said they make no effort to struggle and succeed; they just want quick, easy money. ‘But then what will happen to the rest of the Muslims here?’ he asked rhetorically. ‘Nothing. We have no business infrastructure. The Hindus will not give us a chance, so we must do it ourselves. But all our children want fast money. It is bleak.’

His nephew, an MBA student whose father is an engineer at a large chemicals plant, was one of the few young men I met in Hyderabad who did not have any desire to go to Saudi Arabia or the US to work. He echoed his uncle when he said, ‘I want to stay to do business here to give other Muslims a chance’. Working in Hyderabad is not merely a logical option, but is often a conscious choice made in opposition to the dominant trope of migrating.

However, people like these who stress local development are quite exceptional. More common is the view of Umesh, who says, ‘I must go to the United States. Every day I am in Hyderabad I am losing dollars.’ We calculated his losses at more than $125 for every day he is in Hyderabad and not in the US (it is interesting to note that Umesh calculated his loss in dollars and not in rupees). His classmate Srikanth agreed. ‘Why waste time earning 10,000–15,000 rupees a month when you can earn so much more there? Here there is nothing for us.’ Srikanth planned to go to the US within two years.

Go West Young Woman? Undesired Marriages of Poor Women to Gulf Nationals

Hyderabadi Muslim women who go to Saudi Arabia usually go as spouses of professional workers. Many also go to work in Saudi Arabia, though much less frequently than men. Some go as servants, a few as doctors. Many who get work in Saudi Arabia as servants are wary of going. Stories of physical and sexual abuse abound, and going is considered a great risk. There is risk; consequently it is rare for Muslim families in Hyderabad that are not poor to allow their daughters to go alone
to Saudi Arabia. For poor women though, it is a difficult choice to not go, and give up the relatively good wages that one can earn there.

Another route for young women to get to Saudi Arabia is through marriage. The marriage of poor Muslim teenage girls by their fathers to nationals of Gulf countries is common, yet fraught with danger. Why do Arabs come to Hyderabad to marry? The Arab marriage custom is brideprice (bridegroom’s family gives money to bride’s family), unlike in India where it is dowry (bride’s family gives money to bridegroom’s family). It is too expensive for many Arabs to pay the brideprice in the Gulf, so they come to Hyderabad where they can give much less.9 For Hyderabadi fathers it is an attractive arrangement because, instead of paying to marry off their daughters, they receive cash and gifts. My cook, Abida Bi, said that one girl’s father in the Old City schemed to marry her to an Arab, get them divorced, marry her to another one, and so on until his wife could not take it anymore and had him arrested. Abida Bi said that one Arab national made an offer through an intermediary to marry her daughter, but her son and other family members and neighbours were firmly against it. As it turned out, she said, the Arab married someone else, kept her in a hotel room in Hyderabad for two days, divorced her and left. Shehnaz, whose mother took care of my grandmother, told me in response to that story that someone had made an offer to her mother to marry her daughters to an Arab national. Shehnaz’s mother was standing there and said to me, ‘Better we stay poor than have something like that happen.’

When the marriages fail, as they often do, the consequences for these girls are quite serious. Sultana and Dr. Rehana, social workers in the Old City, deal often with the fallout from forced, failed marriages of young, poor Hyderabadi girls. Sultana said many of these ‘Arab-affected’ girls are taken to places like Dubai, used, and then sold to other Arab nationals. Or the Arabs marry them in Hyderabad, use them for a few days, then leave. Many of these girls end up as prostitutes. She has ‘saved’ (her term) and married off two of these girls. Dr. Rehana accuses the qazis (men who are legally recognised to perform nikkah, marriage contracts) of being pimps who the Arabs pay off to perform these illicit marriages. She mentioned one particular qazi by name, and knew of others. More recently, a 73-year-old United Arab Emirates’ national was arrested in Hyderabad for deserting a Hyderabadi Muslim girl two days after marrying her (Times of India, 28 May 2004).

Not all Hyderabidis take such a dim view of these marriages. Many, if not most, of the young girls being married are themselves second-, third- or fourth-generation Yemeni Arabs, whose male antecedents came at different times during the reign of the Nizams to serve in the armed forces (Khalidi 1997b). The Hyderabadi Arabs are concentrated in one neighbourhood, Barkas, in the southern part of the city. These Hyderabadi Arabs defend such marriages as between culturally similar people, and perfectly acceptable given the context. Moreover, these marriages have been going on in Barkas for a long time. Leonard (2002) reports that there are many such marriages of Hyderabadi women to Arab men that work well, providing economic security for the wife, and for her family in Barkas.
The local Muslim historian mentioned above told me there is a distinction between Barkas girls and other Deccani (Hyderabadi) girls. The former adapt easily to the Gulf environment and are legitimate brides, whereas the Deccani girls are used and abused, and they know it. He told me of how his brother’s servant was given to an elderly Arab by her parents for a big dowry. This historian said to her, ‘You know what will happen once you go?’ The girl replied, ‘I will be sold to another Arab, and possibly another. But what is my chance here? If by chance my parents can marry me off, it will only be to a rickshaw driver who will come home drunk every night … this way, at least, I can send money home for my brothers’ and sisters’ education.’

I do not wish to denigrate the successful marriages of women from Barkas to Arab men; rather I want to point out the perceptions that people in Hyderabad, especially those not from Barkas, have of the dangerous possibilities, and how they react to them. But for many women, the choice to marry a foreign Arab is really no choice at all, since it is dictated by familial obligations. Not unlike the educated young men pumping gas in suburban Chicago, these young women are doing work (and marriage certainly is work) abroad that they would not necessarily do at home. Their stories represent the underbelly of the culture of migration—that migration has become so normatively conditioned, that not going is not a choice. In this case, the parents’ desire to reap the benefits of migration overshadows the knowledge that many of these marriages will end in misery for the girls concerned.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown how the culture of migration affects social life in Hyderabad. I view the culture of migration framework as a complement to strategies of examining economic compulsions and network ties to migrate. Cultures of migration do not exist on their own; they reflect the state of economic dependence in developing countries and the resulting flow of migrants to the developed countries, and they also result from the existence and strengthening of these migrant networks. But, and I feel this is an important point, cultures of migration have to be accounted for when examining the decision-making processes of migrants and would-be migrants. Potential migrants learn why going abroad is desirable before they actually go.

The culture of migration is diffused through Hyderabadi Muslim society, so much so that, while it is impossible for all to go, the desire to migrate has become generalised and normative. This has important consequences for life in the sending society. The definition of status has been radically altered by the effects and social meaning of migrant remittances, to the point where being a migrant in and of itself has become a high-status identity. This ‘migrant-hero’ (generally male, but also female) is desirable for a marriage partner, challenging and even displacing other ascribed status identities of caste and nobility, and even trumping achieved status of education. During the course of fieldwork I came across a few unlikely marriages.
of male labourers in the Gulf with female doctors and other professionals in Hyderabad. A marriage between a male labourer in Hyderabad with a doctor would be laughable; but the marriage of a Gulf labourer with a doctor was sensible enough to those with whom I discussed this. The darker side of the culture of migration manifests itself in the marriage of poor Hyderabadi women with older sheikhs from the Gulf. These women sacrifice themselves for their families in Hyderabad, bearing the burdens, but not the fruits, of migration.

As I have shown, the culture of migration and the desire to migrate also manifest themselves in how people deal with education and work in Hyderabad, shaping the choices they make. For example, where medicine and engineering were the primary choices of professionals, it is now computer science that attracts the brightest, as they are the ones who can most easily get the coveted H1B visa for the US. Many of these same young professionals disdain the idea of working in Hyderabad, instead preferring to wait for the visa. This is not to say that all or most educated Hyderabadiis are in the IT field and are waiting for visas. Rather, the general point of the paper has been to point out how the culture of migration has a generalised effect upon the social atmosphere in which certain types of life choices and social interactions occur.

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Notes


[2] In South Asia, Christians, Muslims and Sikhs are divided by caste, in spite of these religions having egalitarian ideologies.

[3] However, this may change. While I was in Hyderabad in 1998, Saudi Arabia had put a freeze on labour migration, and then lifted it. There is a growing trend in the Gulf states of tightening labour migration, and many people who leave the Gulf states cannot get visas to go back, and fewer visas are being approved. From 1997–2000, nearly 330,000 workers in the Gulf returned to Kerala for good. A study by the Centre for Development Studies (Kerala) found that the rate of reverse migration is unprecedented. This led to an economic recession in Kerala as the ‘petro-dollars’ dried up.


[5] This transformation of migrants is common. For example, Hansen (2001) describes a local celebrity in one of Bombay’s Muslim slums named ‘Europe-rajah’ (Europe-king), who is
respected by all the young men for having not only gone abroad, but to Europe, a place where hardly anyone from the slums can go.

[6] Even just having relatives abroad has become a marker of high status in itself. A middle-aged Hyderabadi doctor I interviewed in New York illustrated this point. She told me how someone asked her unemployed brother-in-law in Lahore, Pakistan what he did. He replied, ‘My brother is in the US’.

[7] There is no legal category called ‘azad’ work visa; apparently the worker goes to Saudi Arabia legally on a work visa, but with the understanding between him and his sponsor that he will not work for the sponsor but will get a job elsewhere. His visa is then transferred to another company, for which the worker pays an additional fee. It is a risky proposition for the worker as, on arrival, he may find employment opportunities lacking and wages lower than expected.

[8] Thanks to Raza Mir, a Hyderabadi professor at Monmouth College in New Jersey, for pointing this out to me.

[9] The United Arab Emirates is encouraging Arab men to marry local women by helping to cut wedding costs and giving other financial incentives. This may also help the women as the extravagant cost of marriage has resulted in marriages happening later in life for women, or sometimes not at all (Aslam 1993).

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